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RUNNING FROM RAMPART
Stanley A. Goldman*
For over one hundred years it has been generally accepted that
flight alone should not be the sole basis of a government right to in-
vade areas otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment. The
United States Supreme Court explained the reasons for this position
near the end of the nineteenth century:
[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that men who are en-
tirely innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime
through fear of being apprehended as the guilty parties, or
from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses.... Innocent
men sometimes hesitate to confront a jury-not necessarily
because they fear that the jury will not protect them, but be-
cause they do not wish their names to appear in connection
with criminal acts, are humiliated at being obliged to incur
the popular odium of an arrest and trial, or because they do
not wish to be put to the annoyance or expense of defending
themselves.'
At the turn of the twenty-first century, however, the Court modi-
fied this attitude. In Illinois v. Wardlow,2 the United States Supreme
Court, in a five to four decision, ruled that under the circumstances
of the case before it,3 an individual who ran upon seeing the police in
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Professor Goldman spent eight
years as a Los Angeles County public defender before joining Loyola's full-
time faculty. A part-time columnist and media pundit, Professor Goldman's
primary claim to fame is having once been the executive editor of the Loyola
ofLos Angeles Law Review.
1. Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 511 (1896).
2. 120 S. Ct 673 (2000).
3. Shortly after noon on September 9, 1995, four police cars converged in
what they suspected was an area of high drug trafficking on the west side of
Chicago in order to investigate possible illicit drug activity. The occupants of
the last of these police vehicles, Officers Nolan and Harvey, noticed an African
American man--later identified as William Wardlow-carrying an opaque
bag. Wardlow allegedly, upon seeing the two officers arrive, attempted to flee
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a high drug trafficking area gave the officers a sufficiently reason-
able suspicion to justify a Terry v. Ohio4 stop and frisk. In reaching
its decision, the majority stated: "Flight, by its very nature, is not
'going about one's business'; in fact, it is just the opposite ...
Headlong flight-wherever it occurs-is the consummate act of eva-
sion: it is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing but it is certainly
suggestive of such." 5
The Wardlow majority did not argue that flight alone is suffi-
cient to justify a police detention. The Court did, however, find suf-
ficient additional suspicion in the suspect's flight from the officers in
a heavy drug trafficking neighborhood. The combination of the high
crime area and flight was enough to justify the stop and frisk.
Few can doubt that a neighborhood's high crime rate is a legiti-
mate factor when answering the constitutional question of whether
the police possessed reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop and
frisk. Yet, nearly thirty years ago, in United States v. Davis,7 the
Federal Circuit for the District of Columbia, while accepting its rele-
vancy, assessed the dangers of overemphasizing the importance of
the scene through an alley. Though the suspect had not appeared to be violat-
ing any laws, Officers Nolan and Harvey briefly pursued, caught, and con-
ducted a protective pat-down search of Mr. Wardlow for weapons. Prior to the
pat-down the officers asked the suspect no questions, nor did they state the
purpose of the forcible stop. See id. at 674-75.
As a part of the pat-down, Officer Nolan squeezed the opaque bag
which the suspect was carrying and, upon feeling a hard, heavy object with a
shape similar to that of a gun, opened the bag and discovered a .38 caliber
handgun and five rounds of live ammunition. Mr. Wardlow was arrested and
tried, with the handgun being successfully offered into evidence against him.
He was eventually convicted of the unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. See
id.
4. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the Supreme Court distinguished between
a full custodial "arrest," which constitutionally required that the arresting offi-
cers possess full probable cause, and a brief "detention," which required only
what the Court described as a "reasonable articulable suspicion." Where there
were sufficient grounds to believe that the detained suspect was armed and
dangerous, the detaining officer was constitutionally permitted to engage in a
pat-down of the exterior of the suspects clothing, and when probable cause
then arose that the suspect was armed, the officer was permitted to intrude in-
side the suspect's clothing in order to retrieve the weapon. See id. at 27.
5. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 676.
6. See id.
7. 458 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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the neighborhood when seeking constitutional justification for police
intrusions:
Although no presumption of guilt arises from the activities
of inhabitants of an area in which the police know that nar-
cotics offenses frequently occur, the syndrome of criminal-
ity in those areas cannot realistically go unnoticed .... It
too is a valid consideration when coupled with other reli-
able indicia or suspicious circumstances. We make this
statement warily, for it is all too clear that few live in these
areas by choice. 8
The Davis court concluded that the high crime problem in cer-
tain areas should be considered cautiously when analyzing Fourth
Amendment issues. Constitutional significance should be given only
to highly specific facts and circumstances that create legitimate sus-
picions, as opposed to mere suspicion by association with the neigh-
borhood in which the suspect is found.
Justice Stevens provided a reason why flight by inhabitants of
such a neighborhood must not have too high a degree of suspicion
attached to it. On behalf of the four dissenters in Wardlow, Stevens
wrote: "It is a matter of common knowledge that men who are en-
tirely innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through
fear of being apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an unwilling-
ness to appear as witnesses." 9 There are also people who simply fear
that a confrontation with members of law enforcement could prove
dangerous, for example, by being caught in the crossfire.' 0
[A] reasonable person may conclude that an officer's sud-
den appearance indicates nearby criminal activity. And
where there is criminal activity there is also a substantial
element of danger-either from the criminal or from a con-
frontation between the criminal and the police. These con-
siderations can lead to an innocent and understandable de-
sire to quit the vicinity with all speed."
8. Id. at 822 (citation omitted).
9. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 680 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Alberty v.
United States, 162 U.S. 499 (1896)).
10. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Additionally, many have feared that terms like "high crime
area" are simply euphemisms for economically depressed, ethnic mi-
nority inhabited inner city neighborhoods.1 2 As the Ninth Circuit's
Judge Reinhardt recently noted in a post-Wardlow opinion:
The citing of an area as "high crime" requires careful ex-
amination by the court, because such a description, unless
properly limited and factually based, can easily serve as a
proxy for race or ethnicity. . . . We must be particularly
careful to ensure that a "high crime" area factor is not used
with respect to entire neighborhoods or communities in
which members of minority groups regularly go about their
daily business, but is limited to specific, circumscribed lo-
cations where particular crimes occur with unusual regular-
ity.
13
Others have spoken of the self-fulfilling prophecy of the police
and as a consequence of the vicious cycle in which minority groups
such as African Americans and Hispanics find themselves trapped in
the inner city areas where they live or work.
Police use Terry stops aggressively in high crime neighbor-
hoods; as a result, African Americans and Hispanic Ameri-
cans are subjected to a high number of stops and frisks.
Feeling understandably harassed, they wish to avoid the
police and act accordingly. This evasive behavior in (their
12. See, e.g., David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When
Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 677 (1994).
The unfortunate fact is that Terry and its progeny have resulted in
stops and frisks of residents of inner cities-primarily poor persons,
African Americans, and Hispanic Americans-far out of proportion to
their numbers, and often without justification. These searches and sei-
zures carry a high price, not only to the individuals involved but to all
of society.
•.. In fact, the terms "inner city neighborhood" and "high crime
area" are synonymous for many Americans, including many of the
regular participants in the criminal justice process. These neighbor-
hoods tend to be poorer, older, and less able to support jobs and infra-
structure than either city neighborhoods more distant from the urban
core or suburban locations.
Id. (citation omitted).
13. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir.
2000).
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own) high crime neighborhoods gives the police that much
more power to stop and frisk.'
4
We are thus lead to the conclusion that it may actually be less
suspicious to run from a possible law enforcement encounter in a
high crime area than to attempt to flee from the presence of the po-
lice in less ominous locations. 15 In a high crime area, the innocent
bystander 16 may more rationally fear that the officers have arrived in
order to deal with a presently existing danger' 7 or at least that the of-
ficers, fearing danger, might be prone to draw their weapons and use
them
If one is seeking a pristine example in support of the critics who
have been concerned with the police behavior in so-called high crime
inner city neighborhoods as well as support for Justice Stevens's dis-
sent from the Wardlow majority, one need look no further than the
Los Angeles Police Department's Rampart scandal. The portion of
Los Angeles policed by the Rampart Division is a textbook example
of the kind of area which may be regularly subjected to overly ag-
gressive police conduct. Considered by the officers who patrol it to
be an area of high crime and heavy drug trafficking, it is only three
14. Harris, supra note 12, at 681.
15. [B]ecause many factors providing innocent motivations for
unprovoked flight are concentrated in high crime areas, the character of
the neighborhood arguably makes an inference of guilt less appropriate,
rather than more so. Like unprovoked flight itselt presence in a high
crime neighborhood is a fact too generic and susceptible to innocent
explanation to satisfy the reasonable suspicion inquiry.
Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16. The Wardlow dissent cites a four-city study conducted over eleven
years. The study found "'substantial increases in reported bystander killings..
. in all four cities.' From 1986 to 1988, for example, the study identified 250
people who were killed or wounded in bystander shootings in the four survey
cities." Id. at 680 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Lawrence W. Sherman
et at, Stray Bullets and "Mushrooms": Random Shootings of Bystanders in
Four Cities, 1977-1988, 5 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 297, 306 (1989)).
The dissent went on to note that "[m]ost significantly for the purposes
of the present case, the study found that such incidents 'rank at the top of pub-
lie outrage."' Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Sherman et al., supra, at
299).
17. See id. at 680 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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percent White and has a mean income of less than half of that of the
City of Los Angeles taken as a whole. 18
The police department's behavior was often allegedly far more
intrusive than one would expect in more affluent, Caucasian areas. It
has been claimed, for example, that the Rampart Division would
routinely conduct "street sweeps" where they would systematically
pick up scores of Latinos and turn them over to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), 19 actions normally not within the port-
folio of local law enforcement. It was reported that roughly 200 of
the individuals who were thus "swept up" were turned over to the
INS for deportation proceedings. Of these 200 individuals, at least
eighty percent were found to have been illegally in the country and
were deported, while the remaining roughly twenty percent were re-
leased.
20
With respect to the type of person typically picked up in these
sweeps, one police officer noted:
"The majority were decent people but they were in the
country illegally and weren't supposed to be here in the first
place,". ... "They were working people on the way home
when they were picked up by LAPD CRASH. Some were
18. INCOME:
Rampart Los Angeles
Median Income $21,110 $43,201
Percent under $ 15,000 37 22
ETHNICITY:
Rampart Los Angeles
Percent Latino 79 48
Percent White 3 30
Percent Black 4 12
Percent Asian 15 10
Percent American Indian <1 <1
See The Rampart Scandal: Genesis of a Scandal, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 25, 2000, at
Al 8 (the figures were rounded up in the original source and therefore add up to
more than 100%).
19. See Anne-Marie O'Connor, Rampart Set Up Latinos to be Deported,
INS Says, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 24, 2000, at Al.
20. See id.
[34:777
RUNNING FROM RAMPART
cooking or had just come from work. A lot of them were
just getting off the bus."2'
Even assuming an eighty percent success rate in so harvesting
illegal aliens, it would certainly raise justifiable concerns amongst
legal residents of the area that, if observed on the street by the police,
they too might be swept up along with many other innocents as well
as the potentially "guilty." Of course, these allegations only scratch
the surface of the reasons why one might have been and continue to
be cautious of contact with Rampart's law enforcement.
There have been scores of charges against individuals and
groups of officers alleging not only the planting of drugs7 and
weapons' upon suspects, but also the injury and death of both sus-
pects24 and innocent bystanders.2 ' The latter were caught in the
21. Id.
22. Anti-gang officers in the Los Angeles Police Department's Rampart
Division routinely and unnecessarily punched, kicked, choked and oth-
erwise beat suspects in an effort to intimidate the gangs that the officers
were charged with policing, according to confidential investigative
documents and interviews. The officers then fabricated elaborate sto-
ries in police reports, even planting drugs on a suspect, to account for
their victims' injuries, disgraced ex-officer Rafael Perez has told inves-
tigators, who are questioning him....
Scott Glover & Matt Lait, Beatings Alleged to be Routine at Rampart, L.A.
TIMEs, Feb. 14,2000, at Al.
23. See Matt Lait & Scott Glover, Rampart Officer is Arrested at Gunpoint,
L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2000, at Al (detailing Officer Durden's account of
planting a "throw-down" gun on a wounded suspect); see also Matt Lait &
Scott Glover, 3 Officers Plead Not Guilty in Plot to Frame Suspect, L.A.
TIMEs, May 16, 2000, at B1 (reporting that a police officer told investigators
that a suspect had been framed on a gun possession charge).
24. See Glover & Lait, supra note 22; see also Ann W. O'Neill, 3 Rampart
Officers Convicted of Corruption: 4th Found Not Guilty, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2000, at Al (reporting the results of the first criminal convictions in the Ram-
part scandal). Prior to publication of this Article, Judge Jacqueline Connor
overturned the convictions of three Rampart Division police officers on
grounds that the jury verdict had been compromised by the jurors' apparent
misunderstanding of a common phrase of police slang. See Maura Dolan &
Mitchell Landsberg, Judges Rarely Admit Error, Experts Say, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 24,2000, at Al.
25. See Matt Lait & Scott Glover, LAPD Charges 6 Officers in Rampart
Case, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 2000, at Al (exposing that LAPD officers in the
Rampart division planted a weapon on the body of a twenty-one-year-old Juan
Saldana after a fellow officer fatally wounded Saldana).
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crossfire of officers perhaps a little too eager to use their guns and
convinced of their own immunity from prosecution for any mis-
takes.26 Even if that immunity no longer exists, can we doubt that
innocent persons living under Rampart's shadow would feel far less
eager to be present during a police investigation than those living in
Los Angeles's somewhat more fashionably affluent 90210 ZIP
code?
27
It must also be understood that actual innocence did not prove
an insurmountable obstacle to successful prosecution of those ar-
rested by some of the police working out of the Rampart Division.
In many of the cases which were eventually dismissed based upon
the revelations that some officers had planted evidence or perjured
themselves, the innocent defendants had originally plead guilty.28
An explanation for this phenomenon is easy to come by. From the
perspective of the defense, danger lurks in the potentially more se-
vere sentences often imposed upon seemingly unrepentant defen-
dants after a trial produced conviction when compared with the
sometimes lesser punishment imposed as part of a negotiated plea
bargain. This reality apparently persuaded many not to run the risk
of basing their defenses upon the seemingly unbelievable claim that
the sworn police testimony pointing to their guilt was merely a "tis-
sue of lies."
The revelations surrounding the Rampart police scandal had al-
ready received considerable national publicity by the time the United
States Supreme Court rendered its Wardlow decision. Yet in spite of
this, the majority did not critically analyze the reality of the relation-
ship that exists between the police and minority groups on the streets
of many of our inner cities. Rather, the Court chose to simply con-
clude that in neighborhoods very much like that policed by the Ram-
part division, running upon the arrival of the police is so suspicious
26. See Scott Glover & Matt Lait, Panel Calls for Punishment of LAPD
Captain, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2000, at BI (reporting that a LAPD captain did
not take action after being told of an officer-involved beating).
27. A section of the City of Beverly Hills which has become synonymous
in popular culture by its ZIP code.
28. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Even the Innocent Can be Coerced into
Pleading Guilty, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 28, 1999, at M5.
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an act that it is sufficient to justify a governmental invasion of pri-
vacy which would otherwise have been constitutionally protected.
There is no question that--even if some or all of the negative
allegations leveled against the Los Angeles Police Department'
prove to be untrue-the Rampart police scandal provides us with an
unfortunate yet excellent illustration of why, just as it was true over a
hundred years ago, many a reasonable and innocent person might
well find it prudent to run upon the arrival of the police. Unfortu-
nately, this turns out to be an even more troubling concern today for
the residents of so-called "high crime areas." Yet the Wardlow ma-
jority chose to single out the inhabitants of these same high crime
neighborhoods for less-rather than greater or even equal--constitu-
tional protection from governmental intrusions.
Once the United States Supreme Court has spoken on a consti-
tutional question there may be very little room to deviate from its
conclusions. Fortunately, the absence of a per se rule created by the
high court in this 5-4 decision may leave some air for lower courts to
maneuver. Several of the lower courts to have considered the issues
raised by Wardlow have chosen to distinguish their facts and thus
reach the conclusion that they are not controlled by the Wardlow
majority opinion.
Some courts have concluded that since the individual stopped in
their cases was merely standing or only walking away and not run-
ning from the police, even though they may have been in a high
crime area when they were stopped, the police were not justified in
detaining them 30  Another court concluded that nothing in a
29. See Ralph C. Carmona, Standing Between Community and Chaos, L.A.
TIMES, June 26, 2000, at B9; Mike Feuer & Cindy Miscikowski, Give Police
Commission a Chance, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 17, 2000, at B9; Matt Lait & Jim
Newton, The 'Rampart Way: Macho, Insubordinate and Cliquish, L.A. TNIMEs,
Mar. 1, 2000, at A16; Roberto Lovato, In Pico-Union, Broken Trust Hurts,
L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 25, 2000, at B7; Patrick MeGreevy, Community Activists
Urge Parks to Restore LAPD Liaison Officers, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 28, 2000, at
B4; Myrna S. Raeder, Tainted Verdicts Leave Evidence Debased and Courts
Sullied, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 2000, at M5; Nicholas Riccardi & Antonio
Olivio, Latino Leaders Relatively Quiet on Rampart, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 29,
2000, at Al.
30. See People v. F.J., 734 N.E.2d 1007, 1010 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (observ-
ing a suspect standing at the entrance of an alley, who, upon seeing the officer,
placed an object in his pocket, did not establish reasonable articulable suspi-
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suspect's behavior of lawfully driving away from the vicinity of the
police was unusual enough to justify a governmental intrusion.3'
These may be small victories in the effort to provide minority
inhabitants of inner city neighborhoods the same constitutional pro-
tection afforded most others, but a careful distinguishing of the
Wardlow holding may prove to be all that is left to us for the time
being or perhaps even for decades to come.
cion as in Wardlow since he was "standing and not running"); see also State v.
Warfield, No. 23932-9-1, 2000 WL 1009035, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. July 21,
2000) ("a well founded suspicion does not arise merely because a group of
people gathered at night in a high crime area and the defendant was one who
walked away when the police approached").
31. See Ex parte James v. State, CR-95-2011, 2000 WL 8004442, at *5
(Ala. June 23, 2000) ("[T]he officer in the case now before us did not articulate
any specific facts that would create a reasonable suspicion that James was in-
volved in criminal activity."). Unlike the flight discussed in Wardlow, here the
court concluded that there was no evidence that the defendant had driven away
from the officers either "hastily, erratically, or nervously." Id. The suspect's
having driven away from the direction of the officers could not be deemed ei-
ther "'unprovoked' or 'unusual,"' since "[t]he people to whom he had been
talking were gone." Id..; see also United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d
1122, 1138 n.32 (9th Cir. 2000) (demonstrating that the majority as well as the
concurrence agreed that "the use of the term 'high-crime area' as a factor in
reasonable suspicion analysis may be 'an invitation to trouble."').
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